DiMaggio is Now Number One

[nanwynnfan]

The ex post facto nature of record keeping to nullify "clutch" is merely one of several viewpoints available to an unbiased observer.

If one wants to use the observable clues as to what may be clutch and what may suggest a lack of sufficient concentration and adaptability to qualify as clutch as a crystal ball to predict future results in given situations, then I would suggest the individual is deluding himself.

I'm suggesting that a GM looking to fill slots on a roster with an emphasis on getting guys whose records suggest comfort in tension-heightened situations [relative to their overall performance in neutral batting situations] would be well-advised to look to more general situations than the narrowly defined limiters, like close-and-late or later than 6th inning, RISP.

A hitter whose neutral OPS is .700 with a K rate of 16%, who has career indicators of advancement to, say .750, 17% with men on and 2 out, and .810, 9% with runner on 3B <2O is sending subtle signals that he's attentive to more dramatic situations and adaptable to prevailing game dynamics.

I'm saying there are clues to a general tendency that, while not handing the GM a crystal ball, can at least provide him with reasons for making a roster decision based on that observable tendancy.

The biggest single common sense argument as to why there SHOULD be clutch is the psychological factor against the pitcher, already stated but repeated here:

1. loss of windup and full motion fluidity;
2. general loss of push-off from stretch, with slide step adjustments and the like;
3. mechanical adjustment to follow through in a fielding position because men are on base;
4. distraction of holding men on base;
5. added distractions of battery-mate in keeping runners honest.

A batter with confidence in his own abilities SHOULD see these factors as opportunities that have the pitcher at a disadvantage - time to cash in.

Of course we're dealing with human beings here, so nothing is set in concrete.

[kflo]

Originally Posted by nanwynnfan

The ex post facto nature of record keeping to nullify "clutch" is merely one of several viewpoints available to an unbiased observer.

If one wants to use the observable clues as to what may be clutch and what may suggest a lack of sufficient concentration and adaptability to qualify as clutch as a crystal ball to predict future results in given situations, then I would suggest the individual is deluding himself.

I'm suggesting that a GM looking to fill slots on a roster with an emphasis on getting guys whose records suggest comfort in tension-heightened situations [relative to their overall performance in neutral batting situations] would be well-advised to look to more general situations than the narrowly defined limiters, like close-and-late or later than 6th inning, RISP.

A hitter whose neutral OPS is .700 with a K rate of 16%, who has career indicators of advancement to, say .750, 17% with men on and 2 out, and .810, 9% with runner on 3B <2O is sending subtle signals that he's attentive to more dramatic situations and adaptable to prevailing game dynamics.

I'm saying there are clues to a general tendency that, while not handing the GM a crystal ball, can at least provide him with reasons for making a roster decision based on that observable tendancy.

The biggest single common sense argument as to why there SHOULD be clutch is the psychological factor against the pitcher, already stated but repeated here:

1. loss of windup and full motion fluidity;
2. general loss of push-off from stretch, with slide step adjustments and the like;
3. mechanical adjustment to follow through in a fielding position because men are on base;
4. distraction of holding men on base;
5. added distractions of battery-mate in keeping runners honest.

A batter with confidence in his own abilities SHOULD see these factors as opportunities that have the pitcher at a disadvantage - time to cash in.

Of course we're dealing with human beings here, so nothing is set in concrete.

nan - if all hitters have the same advantage, and thus overall hitting numbers inflate in these situations, it is not a "clutch" ability to also have inflated numbers. it is those who can consistently inflate at a level greater than expected that would indicate a "clutch" ability. and even then, you'd need to prove it's not just expected random anamolies on a normal curve.

[Grandstander]

I do not agree. Selecting players on the basis of some heightened ability in the clutch, even when expanding the definition of clutch, is a foolish strategy. I would first argue that it is foolish because no such ability actually exists. But even if we granted such an ability, those heightened performances would be coming at the expense of less production in other situations. A .275 hitter is a .275 hitter regardless of how many of his hits come in "clutch" situations. If he hits .300 in the clutch, but .250 the rest of the time, that does not improve his club's chances because his periods of .250 hitting make it less likely that there will be clutch situations.

A club capable of producing five runs of offense a game, is no better off even if they have some special ability to score all five in the 9th inning every single night. Isn't that true? What is true for the club as a whole is true for each individual player. It's what the guy does the whole game which determines his value, not what he does in this inning or this situation rather than any other.

[nanwynnfan]

"nan - if all hitters have the same advantage, and thus overall hitting numbers inflate in these situations, it is not a "clutch" ability to also have inflated numbers. it is those who can consistently inflate at a level greater than expected that would indicate a "clutch" ability. and even then, you'd need to prove it's not just expected random anamolies on a normal curve."

kflo: You seem to have missed my point altogether. On the one hand, I stated why there SHOULD be clutch; but my entire presentation has been that, while all batters MIGHT perceive the advantages, MOST do not; and their progression is neutral to downwards as situational tensions are heightened.

The distinction here, and I'd like to make it with a cleaver is, that "clutch," being defined by very narrow qualifying situations, loses the forest for the trees.

In a 650 PA, 575 AB season, a batter may be expected to come to the plate in a neutral situation @ 350 times or more. That leaves us with 225 AB where the batter faces a situation >neutral. If we dilute that further by:

-counting only close & late situations;
-counting only close & late situations in playoff contention; [as examples]

we effectively reduce the 225 to perhaps 30-50 AB, if that. Then, applying statistical standards, we can pronounce: Insufficient data; noise; random, etc. meaning there is NO clutch.

However, I'm arguing a clutch tendency; and I'm being inclusive in that:

-for my examples, I'm using Men on, 2 Out, yielding >100 AB; and 3B<2O, yielding 10 to 30 additional AB;

-I'M weighing relative AB for a combined OPS

And, I'm inviting posters to select their own heightened-tension situations that I have not used, like RISP. bases loaded, etc.

If the batter appears to rise in OPS as situations heighten, he has that tendency and is "clutch-oriented" as opposed to an Alfonso Soriano, who swings with the same abandon in every situation, with no adjustment for situation and decreased production in heightened challenge situations.

It's a combination of confidence, contact, brains and adaptability resulting in a tendency. It is NOT a razor-shap, clearly defined and unique ability to be superb in the most challenging situatins.

[nanwynnfan]

"I would first argue that it is foolish because no such ability actually exists. But even if we granted such an ability, those heightened performances would be coming at the expense of less production in other situations. A .275 hitter is a .275 hitter regardless of how many of his hits come in "clutch" situations. If he hits .300 in the clutch, but .250 the rest of the time, that does not improve his club's chances because his periods of .250 hitting make it less likely that there will be clutch situations."

I will attempt to respond to this with logic:

1. clearly the first observation, "foolish," comined with "no such ability actually exists," comprises a syllogistic non-starter in that they conspire to beg the question.

2. The subjunctive "if," accepting your .275 player does make room for fair comment. [Let's make him .273 for mathematical simplicity in that he's eternally 3 for 11].

If he has 550 AB and collects 150 hits [.273], and if we accept your .250 in neutral at-bats, say 320, then he has 80 hits in 320 AB probably equal to 120 TB and perhaps 40 potential runs created for those AB.

In 230 remaining AB, he's 69 for 230 at .300; and, since you've granted those are clutch situations, he's probably driven in 50-60 runs and added 104 to his TB total, now at 224. He is also a scoring potential for those 69 hits at @ 25 additional runs.

So, we are left with a guy who hits 149 hits in 550 AB, for 211 TB and 90-115 runs created. You've nearly described Tommy Henrich, whose nickname was "Ole Reliable."

Please, bear in mind, I accepted your model.

[DiamondDave]

nan....


You are only assuming 'normal' situations and situations greater than normal... a false premise.... for there to be normal and greater than normal, there must inherently be situations that are less than normal... I.E. coming to bat in the 8th or 9th with a 10 run lead or with a 10 run deficit, situations with an imminent intentional BB, etc....

Not to mention all the other factors such as talent in the on deck circle, etc....

[WilsonC]

There's also a difference between a heightened ability to perform in clutch situations versus an ability to make adjustments in various situations based on the leverage indexes of various outcomes. For example, with runners on first and second, with zero or one out, and the offensive team down by two, the value of an extra base hit is very high, and the cost of a double play is high. With a runner on third and less than two outs, the cost of a strikeout or short flyball is high. Rather than looking at some broad 'performing in the clutch' skill, it would be worth looking at whether some players are able to adjust their approach in subtle ways to focus on giving themselves a better chance at achieving an outcome that has a high leverage factor in particular game situations.

In that regard, it could be interesting to see some sort of matrix charting out whether some players are better able to achieve specific highly leveraged positive outcomes and avoid specific highly leveraged negative outcomes based on different game situations. It's not clutch in the traditional sense, but it's a way of looking at situation hitting in a way that may provide some reproducible ability-based variance in leveraged game situations that could be percieved as, and have value as clutch.

[nanwynnfan]

"You are only assuming 'normal' situations and situations greater than normal... a false premise.... for there to be normal and greater than normal, there must inherently be situations that are less than normal..."

Normal or norm, or whatever term you choose brings into consideration the average, the median, the mean or whatever base line you select at the start.

I began with the premise that each player has his own individual norm, or neutral point and I plot the progression from that base, which clearly makes it more difficult to proclaim blockbuster results.

Had I opted to start with a norm, around .650 or so, the results would be skewed and exaggerated. I am NOT attempting to sell a hot, new rare commodity that shines against 'nil. What I am attempting to do is to call attention to trends I've never seen used to make any case for player performance in heightened situations:

1. Each player has a performance base @ neutral, which I selected a None on;

2. There are distinct classes of offensive players, for example .700 OPS; .800 OPS; 1.000 OPS, and, of course, the norm you suugest, @ .600-.650 OPS.

3. I selected players on 2 points: those I knew were outstanding by reputation or particular offensive numbers and those I suspected were pressure players despite less headline-grabbing offensive numbers;

4. I am suggesting a sea change in the way we explore clutch - not the needle in the haystack but a trend to offensive opportunism.

At the bottom line, I'm suggesting that opportunistic tendency is at the heart of clutch. I do not claim it's a flawless predictor of success in every tense situation. However, if you have such a guy on you team/bench, you might have this consideration as an added [and valuable] tool in your toolbox.

[Grandstander]

nan....you still have the cake and eat problem to overcome. You are double counting talent. Those clutch situations where the player drives in the surplus runs....comes at the expense of creating such situations In your model, there is no penalty in the 8th inning for failures which took place in the earlier innings. If you are losing 5-1 in the 8th because you failed to score earlier, the value of any clutch hitting in the 8th is offset by those earlier failures. Had they not been failure, there might not be a clutch situation at all in the 8th. It simply does not matter when you do it as long as at some point in the game...you do it.

Something else struck me a short time ago. How come clutch only seems to exist for hitting, at least in terms of what captures the fans minds? How come there aren't any clutch pitchers, clutch fielders or even clutch managers? Why is clutch something that only a has an impact on the hitter? The reason of course is that we made up clutch in our heads for hitters, but didn't bother applying it to the other side of the ledger. Every hit made is a hit surrendered, every strikeout is a hit not gained, every walked charged to a pitcher is a walk gained by a batter and so forth. The books balance.

So, it would have to follow that if there really were players who could elevate their offense in clutch situations, there must also be pitchers who can do it, defenders who can do it...and as noted, even managers who make better decisions when things are more dramatically on the line.

Somehow or other, despite being out there, these folks have escaped notice. Evidence for this is that here we are deep into a discussion of clutch, and this post is the first mention of anything other than clutch hitters. I can recall seeing legions of articles in magazines and newspapers where clutch hitting was discussed, but not a single word about clutch pitching.

That's because it hasn't been invented in our heads yet as clutch hitting has been.

[bedir than average]

So Grandstander, you aren't a fan of Clutch, but you do like Win Probability Added?

[Grandstander]

Originally Posted by bedir than average

So Grandstander, you aren't a fan of Clutch, but you do like Win Probability Added?

I read the explanation for it and I have the same problem with that which I have with the general concept of clutch. It is entirely an ex post facto set of values, using known results to evaluate a situation before it takes place and the results were known.

If the players actually had all the win probability added numbers in their heads when they are at the plate, then counting how well they respond to those situations might make some sense. Of course they don't, so trying to claim value for those responses is a rather vague assertion. i.e...."Soandos batted better in situation where his opportunities to increase his team's chances to win were .04 % or better and less well in situations where the probabilities were lower"....no, I don't buy that at all because Soandso had no clue that these were the conditions under which he was batting.

Would not the primary requirements for defining a clutch situation for a hitter have to include the hitter being aware that it was clutch?

[WilsonC]

Interestingly enough, there was an article on "clutch pitching" on BP today. For pitchers, it's an easier concept, and there are clear examples of guys who perform differently in different 'clutch' situations. (see: Glavine, Tom)

And it makes more intuitive sense for pitchers too. Pitchers are in charge of driving the game plan, whereas hitters respond to the pitcher's plan. Additionally, the variance in performance out of the bullpen versus in the starting rotation suggests that many pitchers can adjust to a higher level of performance in short bursts beyond what is sustainable for 100+ pitches, be it through higher effort or a focus on better stuff.

[Grandstander]

So, how are all the clutch metrics kept balanced when a "clutch" hitter is facing a "clutch" pitcher?.

Honestly, this can grow to ridiculous extremes. If any of this stuff was really valid, we would have situations where managers were making decisions about who to send to the plate based on the clucthitude of the defense. "Do I want a right hander or lefty up there now? Well, Soandos isn't a "clutch" pitcher so we don't have to worry about his ability, however, the opposition's shortstop and thirdbaseman are known to be "clutch" defenders while the other side of their infield has normal defenders. I had better use a lefty because he is more likely to put the ball in play against the non clutch defenders. But wait a sec....I have "clutch" right handed pinch hitter but no "clutch" lefthander pinch hitter, so maybe......"

[nanwynnfan]

"Something else struck me a short time ago. How come clutch only seems to exist for hitting, at least in terms of what captures the fans minds? How come there aren't any clutch pitchers, ....."

Mariano Rivera.

[nanwynnfan]

WilsonC wrote:

"With a runner on third and less than two outs, the cost of a strikeout or short flyball is high. Rather than looking at some broad 'performing in the clutch' skill, it would be worth looking at whether some players are able to adjust their approach in subtle ways to focus on giving themselves a better chance at achieving an outcome that has a high leverage factor in particular game situations."

Exactly. And that is why I featured it as a heading in the first presentation of selected players. However, statitically speaking, if one dares to isolate this situation against "neutral," he'll have his head handed to him simply on the basis of "insuffiecient data samples."

However, I could see some math whiz [not I - too old, not inclined to the tedium] taking that and constructing a model in which it is a modifying factor with real interpretative value, perhaps even as a forecasting tool weighing in age, and past performace history.

That whiz would in all probability need Retrosheet data and the patience of Job to construct his model; but at the bottom line, the thing I'd pay admission to see is, for example, a lifetime .273 hitter proved out to be more "clutch" than his more famous HR-hitting teammate.

I would not surprise me too much, an old Red Sox fan back to pre-WW II Williams & DiMaggio, a Queens, NY Yankee-hater [who liked Dickey, Chandler, & Keller]. It was Keller coming to the plate that made my knees knock; and years later, it was Mize, not Mantle who gave me that same queezy feeling.

Another guy one didn't want to see coming up way back was Ferris Fain, who always found a way to hurt you.

Since we are tossing several ingredients into the mix, here's one tossed at me by my retinologist, who reattached me in 2001: cross dominance. A big baseball fan [and knowledeable too] he's reiterated in conversations that if he were a scout, he'd look for bats left, throws right guys every time. As a baseball characteristic, he sees this as THE single all-around edge an offensive player can have. [Just tossing it into the mix for prospective scouts].