36 Triples

[nanwynn]

Someone else can take it from here. Now we're introduced to the steal. A new concept and a new model greet each new post.

The statistical odds for a steal are even worse tha stretching attempts, with a steal picking up @ .4 run potential at a risk of -.7 runs.

I don't create these formulas; but a guy with 40 steals in 55 attempts would then aggregate runs created to:

40*.4 = + 16 runs

15*-.7 = -10.5 runs, or an aggregate + 5.5 runs/55 atempts or .10 runs/ attempt.

A base runner must be successful in 70% of his attempts in order to make a positive contribution. Few are consistently that good, although catcher skills in this department are generally eroding.

The major contributions of steal threats lie in the upset of pitcher rhythm and flow; battery watchfulness distracted to runner; and slide-step adjustment to pitcher delivery to the plate.

[jtur88]

Setting aside the difference in success rate as irrelevant, the net effect of a successful steal is EXACTLY the same as the net effect of stretching a hit to an extra base.

Given that a stolen base accomplishes exactly the same strategic result as a stretch, I am mystified by your position that the comparison of the two is carrying the discussion to a "new model with every post". The plus-minus stats on stealing are well known. Please explain how they do not mirror the stretch model.

Perhaps it is incumbent on you to demonstrate why the value of a runner on third depends on where the ball was when he ran to third. To use your most recent statistics, I would conclude that a hitter trying to stretch a double to a triple would need to have a 70% success rate to make it a worthwhile. However, since that is a "new model", it apparently has no relevance here.

[nanwynn]

Originally Posted by jtur88

I have found the elusive stat, and it is incomprehensibly unaccountable, seemingly defying strategic logic.. Total triples in 2007, MLB, and ratio of doubles to triples:

None out: 335, 10.06
One out: 283, 10.87
Two out: 320, 8.58

Now, somebody please explain: Why would a hitter be LEAST likely to stretch an EBH into a triple with one out? There is clearly a huge strategic advantage to stretching it with one out, as opposed to none out or two out, when there almost nothing to gain by risking a try for third.

Anybody have any thoughts on this?

The above quoted is your post that started these exchanges, in which nobody challenged your ratios, and all accepted your ratios for the isolated 2007 season as a model for discussion.

You further selected the 10.87 ratio of doubles to triples as a direct indicator of probabilities of batters' willingness to gamble on the bases, presuming that the ratio applied directly to that willingness.

Accepting these suppositions at face value, I have tried to accept the model as pretty good seeding to discuss the gambling aspects of stretching doubles into triples according to the "outs" on the scoreboard.

It was you who took this "elusive" stat to feign interest in the topic you yourself proposed. My observations, directed at you, have simply been to point out that maybe you weren't interested in the question posed at all - just desirous of stirring meandering debate.

Hey, that's fine and your perfect right. However, it is disingenuous of you to suggest others are being reluctant or stubborn in addressing your original scenario.

[nanwynn]

Originally Posted by jtur88

Setting aside the difference in success rate as irrelevant, the net effect of a successful steal is EXACTLY the same as the net effect of stretching a hit to an extra base.

Just using the above to prove my point: You now introduce any stretch, which would include single into double ... virtually a whole NEW topic from your alleged point of initial interest.

Given that a stolen base accomplishes exactly the same strategic result as a stretch, I am mystified by your position that the comparison of the two is carrying the discussion to a "new model with every post". The plus-minus stats on stealing are well known. Please explain how they do not mirror the stretch model.

The first clause is pure supposition, so I don't doubt how "mystified" you might be by conflicting logic. I have pointed out the reality of shape-shifting foci, more than once.

I can address your last question of stolen base vs. stretching without even resorting to statistical studies painstakingly done by other [just pure common sense]:

1. In the two situations, the runner dynamics are opposite: the stealer, no matter how kinetic he may be during his lead and head-games with the pitcher, must nonetheless start from a stopped position, like a sprinter. The batter, stretching for an extra base, is running at full speed and has momentum when he shoots for that extra base. There are other dynamics for him as well:

-Stretching for third base, he ha a big edge if the ball is in play in RF; and the odds shift against him as the ball move to CF and LF.

-Stretching for second base, he is, at several angles, running TOWARD to outfield; so it's probable that he is encouraged because that batted ball is "in the gap."

-Stretching for home, on a batted ball, or as a runner already on and trying to score on another's batted ball, he has distance of throw PROBABLY in his favor + the possibility of an ill-timed defender cut-off of a throw that might have nailed him.

So, your identification of stretch = steal reveals little rational consideration of th actual dynamics involved. Moreover, accurate logging of the stretching efforts and success rates ar not accounted for, even in the most scrupulous of score keeping records.

The numbers 9-2 will tell us that a RF threw a runner out at the plate; but with no narrative notation or noted documentation, it does not account for the batter who took second base on the throw, maybe even third, if the catcher was napping.

The two stats are totally dissimilar in both dynamics and recorded data.

[jtur88]

Given comparable risk, it is good strategy to try to get to third with one out, but it is not good strategy to try to get to third with none out or two out. You are welcome to dispute this fundamental any way you like, and I will quietly let you have your say.

[nanwynn]

Originally Posted by jtur88

Given comparable risk, it is good strategy to try to get to third with one out, but it is not good strategy to try to get to third with none out or two out. You are welcome to dispute this fundamental any way you like, and I will quietly let you have your say.

Typical. Avoid the issue, which is why you were so eager to present this as some mystery to begin with: You had your fixed opinion, so why bother?

Reason turns you off. Conflict turns you on.

[Triad]

Originally Posted by jtur88

Why would a hitter be LEAST likely to stretch an EBH into a triple with one out? There is clearly a huge strategic advantage to stretching it with one out, as opposed to none out or two out, when there almost nothing to gain by risking a try for third.

Anybody have any thoughts on this?

With 1 out and a runner on first base, a slow runner might only get to third base on a long hit, and the batter can go no farther than second base when that happens. With two outs, a slow runner is more likely to score all the way from first than he would be with 0 or 1 outs because he's running on contact, not waiting to make sure if the ball drops in or is caught.

But with no outs, there are fewer situations with a runner on first, so there aren't as many times when a slow runner is blocking a fast runner with no outs.

[jtur88]

Originally Posted by Triad

With 1 out and a runner on first base, a slow runner might only get to third base on a long hit, and the batter can go no farther than second base when that happens. With two outs, a slow runner is more likely to score all the way from first than he would be with 0 or 1 outs because he's running on contact, not waiting to make sure if the ball drops in or is caught.

But with no outs, there are fewer situations with a runner on first, so there aren't as many times when a slow runner is blocking a fast runner with no outs.

Thanks for logically addressing the issue, upon which I had clearly shown that I had a fixed position and would not listen to reason. (Maybe you can guess what my fixed position was.) I agree that the situations you described couild contribute to the imbalance.

Would you not expect the out-distribution of doubles to be influenced similarly, for the same reasons, though? Yet, there are more 1-out doubles than 2-out doubles, so slow runners clogging the bases does not seem to be a factor there. If slower preceding runners is a factor, the ratio of doubles to triples ought to remain consant, since prededing runners would affect both similarly.

It turns out that 2007 was a little bit anomalous. Over the past four seasons, the ratio of doubles to triples evens out more, at
0-out 9.91
1-out 9.85
2-out 8.73 (most triples)
This would suggest that your clog factor could be an indicator, but in no more than 10% of situations. But it would imply, as well, that number of outs is fairly irrelevant in a runners decision to stretch, which surprises me.

[Triad]

Originally Posted by jtur88

Thanks for logically addressing the issue, upon which I had clearly shown that I had a fixed position and would not listen to reason. (Maybe you can guess what my fixed position was.) I agree that the situations you described couild contribute to the imbalance.

Sure, no problem. Yeah, there are probably many variables involved.

Originally Posted by jtur88

Would you not expect the out-distribution of doubles to be influenced similarly, for the same reasons, though? Yet, there are more 1-out doubles than 2-out doubles, so slow runners clogging the bases does not seem to be a factor there. If slower preceding runners is a factor, the ratio of doubles to triples ought to remain consant, since prededing runners would affect both similarly.

I'd say there could be another x factor involved with doubles, because 2nd base is a relatively short throw for all fields, whereas 3rd base is a very long throw from right field (and a semi-long throw for the center fielder from right-center).

Let's say Edgar Martinez is on 1st, and a Ichiro hits one down the line that the right fielder cuts off. Edgar has the added luxury of knowing that the right fielder has a long throw to make, and so it's probably just as easy for him to get to 3rd on a hit down the right field line as it is for Ichiro to get a double out of it. The two events are probably going to occur at a similar rate anyway, and the slow runner won't often stop at 2nd on a ball to right which the fast runner could have made it to 2nd on.

On the other hand, in a potential triple situation, if Edgar is on 1st, and Ichiro hits one down the right field line that goes into the corner and rattles around a little, Edgar doesn't continue to go farther away from the right fielder as he's going from 3rd to home, so a lot of times he's going to stop at 3rd. Meanwhile, Ichiro would have made it to 3rd base more easily than Edgar would have made it home. And the right fielder's throw would be equidistant toward 3rd or home.