Especially Dumb Managing

[Grandstander]

With a good general awareness of the real odds in play for managerial decisions, I tend not to fault managers when something backfires, the odds are typically so close to 50-50 on most moves. Sometimes managers will buck the odds to play a hunch, or because he knows something is going on with particular players which alter the seeming odds.

Now and again though, a manager will do something so extremely foolish that one is left wondering what he possibly could have been thinking.

Such was the case last night with John McLaren of the Mariners. The situation was this: The A's went into the bottom of the ninth with a one run lead and their closer Houston Street on the mound. The first batter for Seattle was Ichiro! and he wound up drawing a walk. The next batter was seconbaseman Jose Lopez, a .319 hitter who was already 4 for 4 on the night. I was fully expecting Lopez to take a few pitches while Ichiro! stole secondbase, and thus was hoping that Street could get in a couple of good strikes while Lopez was taking. Instead, Streets first pitch was high and outside.....and Lopez lunged up after it....in order to bunt. I was shocked, here was a situation where one of the league's very best baserunners is on first, no one is out, a hot, hot hitter was at the plate...and he's ordered to bunt???

Well, bunt he did, popping the ball weakly in the air in foul territory where it was easily caught by the A's firstbaseman. Ichiro! remained at first. After Raul Ibanez flied out, with no attempt at a steal by Ichiro!, Adrian Beltre came to the plate as the Mariner's last hope. Now we have a situation where Ichiro! getting thrown out on a steal attempt will end the ballgame in the A's favor.....and now McLaren sends him. He was safe, but what a foolish risk it was. A few pitches later, Beltre grounded out to end the game.

Anyone understand what McLaren might have been thinking with all this?

[bedir than average]

To understand McLaren here you must first realize that John McLaren is stuck in a 70s style NL ballgame. He doesn't really know that ANY research has been done on baseball strategy/tactics. What was true then, is true now and for always. Seriously he's hardwired that way.

So with Lopez you have a two hole hitter in the classic wasted (idiots say productive) out mode. Oddly, local talk radio host and former Major Leaguer Jeff Nelson defended the move saying "He's a two hitter, his job is to move the runner over no matter what." There is little to no recognition that in those circumstances Street is likely to be pitching a little bit away from the former All Star second baseman who is off to a 319/320/415 start, but considering the baserunner, that high batting average matters, on most singles Ichiro is likely to be on third. When Ichiro walked, the Mariners had a 35% chance of winning the game. McLaren dropped that down to 22% because he chose to have a bad bunter bunt in a non-bunt situation.

The timing of Ichiro's steal was also absurd. When he did steal after the second out the chances of winning only went up 5% because of the out situation (2). A man on second with only one out has a much better chance of scoring (about 16%) and kills the chances of a Raul Ibanez GIDP (recall there would have been only one out), while yes Raul is off to a hot start 326/375/565, the steal doesn't prevent Raul from getting a hit it would have just maximized the effectiveness of Ibanez solid bat.

I don't understand the thinking there at all. John McLaren chose to lose that game. There's some kind of study that shows the difference between an awful manager and a great manager is 10 games (+/- 5) McLaren is showing early in the season that he's easily a -4, if not a -5.

Congrats on the win, we gave it to you.

[Grandstander]

Well, thanks, we will take it.

How can someone who evidences such a poor understanding of the basic odds, have a job as a big league manager in this day and age? That +/- 5 games spread you referenced, should be a matter of differing skills related to handling personnel decisions, keeping the club focused, spreading the pitching work around to maximum effect and so forth. At the MLB level, it should not be a matter of failure to grasp what anyone who has played 100 games of Strat-o-Matic baseball has learned.

[jtur88]

One of my biggest gripes about Tony LaRussa is his zeal for wasting his number two hitter by bunting over his leadoff man. Presumably, a decent leadoff man has a certain capacity to steal, and presumably, a decent number two hitter can help the team in more fruitful ways than sacrificing his plate appearance. Yet, TLR does it over and over and over and over again. If he is always going to bunt with his number two hitter, why doesn't just put the pitcher in the number-2 spot, since he's not batting him ninth anyway. Often, the number two hitter just squares around once, early in the count. But if he squares around and takes a called strike, he has just put himself at a more disadvantaged count when the bunt/take sign is off.