IR said:
Quote:
And as I've somewhat stated before, this offseason is hard for me to gauge at this point. Nearly all of the moves made, when evaluated individually, seem to oscilate between perfectly acceptable and in some cases, downright smart.
However, when you step back and look at the big picture, it seems like we just collected a proverbial flock of 4th and 5th starters. Not a bad commodity to have, and indeed with so much competition there exists a chance that somebody comes out and pitches above their head (as in, a solid/strong #3). I'm just not sure it was wise to throw nearly all of our eggs into that basket.
As for Tavares, as things currently stand I view that as an essentially lateral move from Sullivan,
|
Which brings me to my question. (This is the wrong thread for it, but since the thought started here, I guess it belongs.) How do these moves look from a sabermetric perspective? By that I mean net projected wins added/lost. I'll use the PECOTA WARP-1 (wins above replacement player) projections, which are fine for MLB veterans, not so good (as we've seen) for minor leaguers. Other measures may be better (like BP's WXRL?) but the difference should be minimal.
Starting Pitching:
We started with Jennings (4.4) + Cook (4.0) + Francis (4.0) + Kim (3.6) + Fogg (2.5) = 18.5.
O'Dowd basically substituted Rodrigo Lopez for JJ (saving between half a million and a million bucks in the process), and ended with Cook, Francis, Kim, Fogg, and Lopez (3.5) = 17.6. By the way, Hirsh (2.7) or Buchholz (1.6) may take the place of Fogg and/or Kim; adjust accordingly.
NET CHANGE: -1 win. I'm o.k. with this, although I think I would've sent Fogg packing. Still, as HF notes, even if Fogg wins his arbitration, someone may pick him up in exchange for essentially nothing, so we're probably not stuck with him.
Bullpen:
Add LaTroy Hawkins (1.0) and probably Dan Kolb (0.6) in exchange for Mesa (0.7) and King (0.4), and probably save about a million bucks in the process. Of course, this may be a bit unfair, since one thing O'Dowd did accomplish was some more flexibility in the pitching staff. Buchholz could probably slide into the pen and be effective -- BP had his component ERA right at 5.00 last year as a starter, and if going to the pen typically knocks off about .8, then he's a better option than the Kolbs of the world.
NET CHANGE: + .5 win. I'm o.k. with this, too, in that if you're going to buy a load of horses**t, it's better to get it slightly cheaper by the bushel.
Position players:
Add/keep Javy Lopez (1.3) + Kaz Matsui (1.7) + Willy Tavares (3.4), subtract JD Closser (2.0), Luis Gonzalez (0.9), and Ryan Spilborghs (2.0) OR Choo Freeman (0.8).
NET CHANGE: + 1.5 win, assuming Choo gets the backup CF job; + 2.7 wins assuming Spilborghs gets the job. [Memo to Dan O'Dowd: the single greatest impact move you can make this offseason is dumping Choo Freeman!] In the abstract, I'm o.k. with this. On paper the club is a little bit better at the 8 positions. But only a little bit.
OVERALL CHANGE: + 1 win. Whoop-de-doo.
Here's an interesting exercise: we've all got our own favorites out there. I was all for Dave Roberts, Adam Kennedy, and Eric Gagne. Here's how that would've played out:
The Jackass's Solution: JJ trade happens. (Therefore, no Dave Roberts, since there's not room for him and Willy T.) Instead of signing Hawkins ($3.5)and trading for Lopez ($4.5) and signing KazMat ($1.5) and offering Fogg arbitration ($3 million at best), we sign Kennedy and Gagne.
Starters: Cook, Francis, Kim, Hirsh, Buchholz = -1.5 wins as compared to '06.
Relievers: Gagne (5.6) and Kolb type instead of Hawkins/Kolb: +5 wins as compared to '06. [Yeah, that's assuming Gagne throws 56 innings; he might throw zero. But it's the kind of gamble that strikes me as worth it, since the chance of winning 86 games and competing is a lot more valuable than the risk of winning 73 instead of 77 games. Who cares whether you win 73 or 77?] If Gagne pitches a lot and hits his incentives, everyone's happy and O'Dowd hasn't spent any more than he did on the Hawkins/Fogg/Lopez types. If Gagne's hurt, he doesn't hit his incentives and O'Dowd has actually saved money; he can go out and trade for someone during the season. And Gagne only got a 1-year deal, so you're not stuck with him forever.
Position players: sign Adam Kennedy (3.5) instead of KazMat and spend an extra couple million bucks. Keep Closser instead of Javy Lopez (I'll call that a wash). Net change: + 2 wins over '06.
Total Net Change if the Jackass is in charge: +5.5 wins. Since you're starting with a Pythagorean .500 club, that means that if Gagne stays healthy (by the way, that means Fuentes falls into his best role, or is traded if the right deal emerges) you might just hit 86-87 wins. And you might just sneak into the playoffs. Worst case? You win 75.
That's my main complaint. O'Dowd was so ultra conservative that he's virtually guaranteed that the absolute best-case scenario is about 82 wins. He thinks the absolute downside is about 79 wins, and he thinks that's good. It's called "saving your job." Monfort said .500 is the standard by which all will be judged (it's in Armstrong's Post article today), and damned if O'Dowd isn't playing it to hit .500. No risks = no getting fired.
I think O'Dowd's wrong. Monfort may care if this team win 79 as opposed to 72. I don't, and I don't think most fans do either. And I think he's wrong in thinking that guys like Rodrigo Lopez and LaTroy Hawkins are reasonably sure things. I personally think Hawkins is finished (BP's PECOTA card has his "Collapse Rate" at 61% -- so far, that's the highest I've seen, and it is no doubt a symptom of that rapid and scary drop in his K rate). Lopez is 31 and the best you can say about him is that he had some bad luck; the worst you can say about him is that he's in a steep decline. So by playing it conservatively O'Dowd may very well wind up with a 73 win team and no job next year.
They'll never call him Gamblin' Dan ... kind of reminds me of my least favorite coach of all time, Pat Dye of Auburn (football). He earned the nickname "Tie Dye" by inexplicably kicking a field goal to tie the score ... in a bowl game ... with no overtime ... with nothing at stake.