[nanwynn]

Originally Posted by jtur88

What you did not account for, though, is the fact that a team with a leadoff double will often give up an out to get him to third, obviously underscoring the advantage of stretching the double to a triple.

I believe you just constructed a 1 + 3 = 5 argument, in that you mixed up your ingredients as if you hadn't done so.

To illustrate what I mean, I'll revert to the 24 Base-Outs Situation chart once again:

1. You now introduce a LEAD-OFF double with the willingness to sacrifice an out to get that runner to third base:

Situation..............Outs..........Run Probability

2B........................0................ 1.068

3B........................1................ .897

none on.................1................ .249

So our doubles hitter has led off the inning; and in the normal course of baseball [as far as statistical probability is concerned] he should score, a situation which inf fact anticipates a rally of sorts.

However, expectation is best converted into reality by sound strategy and execution, so the question arises, "If I sacrifice the runner to third and I now have one out, how are my odds?"

The answer is 89.7% probability of scoring a 16.01% reduction but very nearly even money that the runner will score before the third out is recorded.

You have introduced a new set of parameters [outs; bases] to illustrate how I did not address your first parameters [out; bases].

I'm assuming that a batter hits a ball that could be stretched to a triple with equal frequency irrespective of the number of outs.

That seems logical. The number of outs will not generally affect the free-swinging results of batted balls, if the sacrifice is taken off the table.

If the team strategy is so often to give up a "productive" out to move that runner to third, it would certainly seem that the batter would respect that philosophy and try more frequently (rather than the prevailing less frequently) to get there without necessitating that following out.

That, if you read it carefully, is illogical: the batter-runner, considering the team's "strategy" takes a risk at direct odds with that strategy.

Granted that there is the risk of losing the baserunner entirely, but the risk remains the same regardless of how many outs. However, the reward increases significantly with one out,, when weighted against the constant risk.

I guess all this proves is that you did not read my citation of statistical odds and how they vary dramatically from one base-out situation to another, or, having read it, chose to disregard it.

The numbers presented are not mine: they are the statistically regressed outputs of play-by-play RESULTS of real in-game situations over millions of inputs.

There is, in fact, the oft-repeated adage, that you don't make the first or third out at third base. But hitters violate that, by electing to stretch triples more often, rather than less, in that situation.

You pronounce this general conclusion in a thread you designed to illustrate the exact opposite of your conclusion.

You open with a seasonal record for three-baggers that will probably never be matched, and you further show declines in triples relative to other batted ball effects and then conclude "by electing to stretch triples more often, rather than less, in that situation."

Don't know how any observations could satisfy such apparent illogic. It's like trying to catch time in a bottle.