Quote:
Originally Posted by jtur88
I have found the elusive stat, and it is incomprehensibly unaccountable, seemingly defying strategic logic.. Total triples in 2007, MLB, and ratio of doubles to triples:
None out: 335, 10.06
One out: 283, 10.87
Two out: 320, 8.58
Now, somebody please explain: Why would a hitter be LEAST likely to stretch an EBH into a triple with one out? There is clearly a huge strategic advantage to stretching it with one out, as opposed to none out or two out, when there almost nothing to gain by risking a try for third.
Anybody have any thoughts on this?
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I'll take a shot at that.
Ballparks have shrunken considerably in expanse of OF playing areas from the time triples have been cited as being numerous. I picked a personal favorite season of my own, 1941, not too unlike current seasons in terms of scoring and BA numbers. to highlight one contributing factor, batter strike out rates.
1. In 1941, with no DH in play to warp numbers, here's how out distributions looked:
League.......AB.........Hits.........Outs........B A.............K........DP
A.L. .......43125......11492.......31633.... .266 ..... 4425.....1242
N.L. .......42729......11039.......31690.... .258...... 4414.....1152
If we subtract DP's from the out base [assuming duplication of batted ball outs, and knowing that there are some DP's invoving K's] we see that K's
in the AL constituted 14.56% of outs, 14.45% in the NL. That's about one out in seven is a K. Contact was a big deal and batters hated the K. More contact + more OF space = more triples.
2. In 2007, making the same entries as for 1941, we get:
League.......AB..........Hits.........Outs.......B A.............K.......DP
A.L. .......78294......21181........57113... .271...... 14740....2225
N.L. .......89488......23796........65692... .266...... 17449....2429
Doing the same calculations as above for 1941, we get 26.85% K's by out in the AL and 27.58% in the NL, the 2.7% hike in the NL presumably being pitchers batting for pitchers. From one in 7, we've gone to nearly 3 in 10. Smaller OF dimensions + less contact [by half in outs no longer on batted balls] = fewer triples.
The batting climate of all-or-nothing, with high K rates can build doubles and HRs; but 3B become the middle man squeezed out by dimensions, batting dynamics, and financial [and statistical] risk-reward considerations.
3. In addition to park dimension contractions and decreased batting contact, we also face the fact that ballplayers are major investments, with agents and representatives; and millionaire players are a liability if they are injured [increased risk stretching for any extra base, low risk-reward].
4. From the standpoint of odds, or scoring probability, here's how John Thorn & Pete Palmer ["The Hidden Game of Baseball"] presented the 24 base-out situation relative to jtur's question on not stretching for a triple with one out:
Base Situation.........Outs..........Run Probability
none on...................1.............. .249
2B...........................1............. .699
3B...........................1............. .897
If a batter hits a safe double with one out, the statistical odds of his scoring if he stays put are 69.9%. IF he takes a shot at third by stretching for a triple, he MAY up his odds by 28.3% to 89.7%. However, if he loses that gamble, his team faces a reversion back to none on with two out for his failure, or 24.9%.
Our double hitter risks a 64.4% drop in potential in return for a 28.3% possible reward, not a promising return.
Furthermore, in a climate of 27% outs via K, there is little guarantee that being on 3B with one out will score on a batted-ball grounder or sac fly, especially with whiffs being so prevalent.
The risk would have been a better one in former times and ballparks, for a multitude of reasons.